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REFLECTIONS OF A RECOVERING LAWYER: HOW
BECOMING A COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST-AND (IN
PARTICULAR) STUDYING ANALOGICAL AND CAUSAL
REASONING-CHANGED MY VIEWS ABOUT THE FIELD
OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
BARBARA A. SPELLMAN*
INTRODUCTION: "PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW"-AND I
For reasons that will become clear, I need to start this Article
with a brief academic autobiography. After college, I attended law
school, received a J.D., and in the mid-1980's worked for a big New
York City firm and then a legal publisher. I also did short stints for
the Environmental Protection Agency, the U. S. Attorney's Office,
and Legal Services. Next, I went to graduate school in cognitivepsy-
chology. When I arrived, many faculty members tried to get me in-
volved in law-related research. But I had hated being a lawyer so
much that I would just cross my fingers in the vampire-away sign and
get on with the research I cared about-how people reason. It took
me twice as long to get my Ph.D. as it did to get my J.D., and now I
have been a psychology professor for more than twice as long as I had
worked as a lawyer. Recently, as a (relatively happy) psychology pro-
fessor, I have allowed my students, both undergraduate and graduate,
to push, persuade, and cajole me into teaching courses and doing re-
search on law-related issues.
Thus, for the last four or five years, I have been playing on the
fringes of the field that, where I live now, is called "Psychology and
Law." (This might not be quite the same thing as the field that law-
yers call "Law and Psychology.") I have taught two different courses
with the phrase "Psychology and Law" in their titles; I have attended
American Psychology-Law Society conferences; and, at those confer-
ences, and many others, I have heard dozens of talks on "Psychology
and Law." And I worry. Why isn't the richness of what I have learned
as a cognitive (and sometimes social) psychologist being reflected in
* J.D., Ph.D.; Department of Psychology, University of Virginia.
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the research choices of psychology and law devotees or in the prac-
tices of the legal profession?
People who comment on the field of psychology and law vary be-
tween optimistic and pessimistic about what the field has accom-
plished and where it is going. In 1993, Craig Haney reviewed the ef-
fects of psychology and law research on the legal change during the
previous decade. On one hand he points to some triumphs: psychol-
ogy had influenced the legal system with regards to eyewitness testi-
mony, testimony from hypnotized witnesses, predictions of danger-
ousness, the treatment of children, and some other examples.1 On the
other hand he notes that he would
be remiss in my discussion of psychology's impact on appellate
court decisions if I did not note that, with the exception of a very
few issues, the discipline of psychology has been cited approvingly
by members of the Supreme Court more often in dissent than in
majority opinions, when it has been cited at all.2
Among other criticisms he has of the psychology and law endeavor as
practiced by empirical psychologists are that we focus too much on
procedures and processes within the legal system rather than out-
comes, and that we are stuck addressing small, rather than large,
questions because we are methodologically conservative.'
The end of the millennium prompted some other authors to re-
view the history of the field.4 Ogloff notes some of the advances made
by the field but then turns to a more critical perspective. He identifies
twelve issues that need to be addressed if the field is to continue to
grow: among his concerns are the narrowness of the range of topics
addressed in psychology and law and the atheoretical nature of much
psychology and law research.5 He and others have noted the pre-
dominance of work on eyewitness testimony, jury decision-making,
and criminal law. 6
1. Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade, 17 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 371, 372-74 (1993).
2. Id. at 376.
3. Id. at 381.
4. James R. P. Ogloff, Two Steps Forward and One Step Backward: The Law and Psy-
chology Movement(s) in the 20th Century, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 457, 457 (2000). This paper
was presented as the L999 Presidential Address to the American Psychology-Law Society. Addi-
tionally, see generally Norman J. Finkel et al., Everyday Life and Legal Values: A Concept Pa-
per, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 109 (2001); Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contex-
tual Model of Justice, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 3 (2002).
5. Ogloff, supra note 4. at 472,474.
6. Id. at 46041.
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I have my own hypothesis about why the range is narrow-and
why, in particular, many of the topics have to do with trials. My hy-
pothesis has to do with where psychologists get their ideas for psy-
chology and law research-television and movies. We see depictions
of trials and we just can't stand it. How could a legal system possibly
assume that people reason that way? I don't want to derogate other
people's research so I will report that at least three of my graduate
students have proposed research based on ideas from television
shows or movies ("The Practice," "Law and Order," and "A Time to
Kill").7 And yes, I let them go ahead with the research because the
students are asking interesting theoretical questions about important
reasoning processes; jury decision-making is merely the application.
I also have my own hypothesis about why the field tends to be
atheoretical -that is, because it is easier to be atheoretical than theo-
retical, and because, for now, people can still get away with it. One
thing that people do in psychology and law research is take a well-
researched phenomenon from cognitive psychology-like the primacy
effect or the hindsight bias or the predictions of support theory-and
see whether it occurs in judicial settings or to the people involved injudicial proceedings (jurors, lawyers, judges). There is no new theory,
just the question: does it happen here? Of course, to be fair, some-
times the answer is important. But without theory we don't know how
far to generalize: Just these kinds of cases? Just judges with this train-
ing? Another thing that people study in psychology and law research
is "what ifs." What if we changed some procedure? Again, to be fair,
the answer might be important; but again, without theory, we don't
know why it works and how far to generalize.
What I am going to argue is this: Rather than getting ideas by
watching television shows and seeing how psychology might be rele-
vant to law, if cognitive and social psychologists just sat back and
looked at their own everyday basic research, they would see that it
could be easily applied to the legal system. To illustrate, I describe
some areas of cognitive and social psychology research that I, my col-
leagues, and my students, have been involved in during the past
dozen years and show how they can be applied to the law. This Arti-
cle includes in depth discussions of analogical and causal reasoning
research, and briefer references to other research areas including
7. Note that David E. Kelley, head writer for The Practice, and John Grisham, author of
A Time to Kill, have law degrees.
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metacognition, memory inhibition, affective forecasting, and stereo-
typing.8
I. ANALOGICAL REASON ING
When I first got to graduate school, I started doing research on
analogical reasoning. When I tell people that, their eyes glaze over.
People remember being tortured by the "analogy" section on the
SATs and GREs and, yes, even the LSATs.
Excruciating: painful :: Joyous : ???
Analogies of this type constitute parts of those tests and both
verbal and visual analogies are a big component of most IQ tests.
Cognitive psychologists know a lot about how analogy works-at
least in the laboratory. Researchers have used the four-term verbal
problems illustrated above as experimental stimuli, although, asde-
scribed below, we have also used more complicated real-world type
materials.
It turns out, of course, that law school is largely about analogy;
law schools just fail to tell students that explicitly. And the reason law
school is largely about analogy is because the common law-and the
principle of precedent-is totally about analogy. According to Sun-
stein, "reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reason-
ing."
9
Below, I first introduce some analogy "basics." Then, I discuss
two ways in which analogy research in psychology can be applied to
the legal system broadly construed: in the teaching and training of law
students and in understanding what drives the use of precedent in ju-
dicial decision-making and legal scholarship.
A. Analogy Basics
In analogical reasoning-or what I will refer to as "analogical
transfer"-people take a situation that is well understood (source)
and use it to help explicate a situation that is less well understood
8. 1 want to make it clear that I am not approaching this from the "heuristics and biases"
perspective; that is, I am not going to argue that people are bad reasoners and that the law
should take that into account. Plenty of other people have made that point. Rather, most of
what I am going to describe are domains in which people are actually pretty good reasoners
(e.g., analogical and causal reasoning), and note where the law might want to take that into ac-
count.
9. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1993).
I[Vol 79:1187
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(target).1 Goals of analogical reasoning may include: to make sense
of the new target situation, to explain it, to figure out what steps to
take next, or to persuade others of a particular interpretation.
1. Types of Similarity in Analogy Use
Two important distinctions we make in psychology are those: (a)
between surface (or "superficial") and relational (or "structural") fea-
tures in the analogs,11 and (b) between the processes of retrieval and
mapping. 2
The difference between relational and surface features is won-
derfully illustrated by some experimental stimuli developed by Ar-
thur B. Markman and Dedre Gentner. 13 Their experiment used pic-
tures; to save space I provide descriptions.
Top Picture: A tow truck towing a car to the left along
a road.
Bottom Picture: A (very similar-looking) car pulling a
motorboat to the right along a road.
Subjects were asked to look at both pictures and then were asked
to state which object from the top picture "matched" the car from the
bottom picture.14 There are two very plausible answers: (a) the car-
because it is a nearly identical thing, and (b) the tow truck-because
it is playing the same role. Matching the car to the car relies on sur-
face features-they look similar, they carry passengers on the road,
etc. Matching the car to the tow truck relies on relational features-
they are each pulling something else that cannot move over the road
on its own.
Note that the distinction between types of features is essential in
the use of precedent. A good precedent is not one in which the parties
themselves (or property in question) are similar but rather one in
which similar (legal) relations hold between the relevant parties or
10. Holyoak and colleagues refer to the already-understood analog as the "source analog";
Gentner and colleagues refer to it as the "base analog."
11. Dedre Gentner, Structure-Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy, 7
COGNITIVE SCI. 155, 159-62 (1983): Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard, Analogical Mapping by
Constraint Satisfaction, 13 COGNITIVE Sci. 295, 295-96 (1989).
12. Gentner, supra note 11. at 164-66; Holyoak & Thagard, supra note 11, at 296-97.
13. Arthur B. Markman & Dedre Gcntner, Structural Alignment During Similarit
, 
Com-
parisons, 25 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 431,433-35 (1993).
14. Id. at 435-39.
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property. Developing expertise in law means seeing through the sur-
face similarities and understanding which relational similarities mat-
ter. 15
2. Steps in Analogical Transfer.
Several steps are involved in analogical transfer; here I refer to
retrieval, mapping, and extension. 6 To illustrate, I use examples from
an article in which some experimental materials were based on the
1991 Persian Gulf War. 17
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United States
was quite uncertain about what, if any, action to take. The informa-
tion was mixed: Kuwait was not a democracy but had oil we needed;
the United States had supported Saddam Hussein in the Iraq-Iran
war but now he seemed to be threatening the entire region. As so of-
ten happens with conflicts of this type, people looked for historical
political analogies to help make sense of the situation.18
Thus, the first step in using an analogy is retrieval-finding rele-
vant source analogs in memory. 19 What possibilities come to mind?
Other wars that were fought in the Middle East, World War II, Viet-
nam, etc.
The next step in using an analogy is to create a mapping-a set of
appropriate correspondences between elements of the source and
target.20 In our study, we asked subjects to make sense of the analogy
that many people were using-that Saddam Hussein was like Hitler.
We said to them: "Regardless of whether or not you think this anal-
ogy is appropriate, we would like to know what you think the analogy
really means." We then gave them a list of several countries and lead-
ers-Iraq, the United States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and George
Bush-and asked them to write down the "most natural match in the
15. Note that the key to developing good search tools for finding relevant precedents is
also based on finding relevant relational similarities.
16. Scholars have described analogical reasoning as using three, four, or five steps, depend-
ing on which part of the process they want to emphasize. Other steps include the initial step of
creating a mental representation of the source analog. A final step may involve generalizing two
or more analogs to form an abstract schema.
17. Barbara A. Spellman & Keith J. Holyoak, If Saddam Is Hitler Then Who Is George
Bush? Analogical Mapping Between Systerns of Social Roles, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 913, 913 (1992).
18. For excellent examples see YUEN FOONG KHONG, ANALOGIES AT WAR: KOREA,
MUNICH, DIEN BIEN PHU, AND THE VIETNAM DECISIONS OF 1965 (1992).
19. Spellman & Holyoak, supra note 17, at 914.
20. Id.
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World War II situation (from the point of view of someone who
thinks Hussein is analogous to Hitler). If you think there is no good
match, write 'none."' 21
Subjects fell into one of two basic patterns. Nearly all mapped
Iraq to Germany-based on the relational similarity: if Saddam is
analogous to Hitler, and Saddam is the leader of Iraq, and Hitler was
the leader of Germany, then Iraq must be analogous to Germany.22
However, the mappings for the United States (or "US-'91") and
George Bush varied across subjects. Some thought that US-'91
matched the United States of World War II ("US-WW2"). Both sur-
face and relational similarities drive that mapping. Subjects who
mapped US-'91 to US-WW2 went on to map George Bush to Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt ("FDR"). Other subjects thought that US-'91
matched Great Britain. Those subjects went on to map George Bush
to Winston Churchill. Regardless of other mappings, subjects
matched Kuwait to Austria, Poland, or both.
The third step in analogical transfer is extension-using the map-
ping, and knowledge of the source, to construct inferences about the
target. 23 For example, if one believed that Saddam was like Hitler,
and one believed that Kuwait was like Austria or Poland, one should
believe that Saddam was likely to try to take over other countries,
that appeasement would not work, and that military action was neces-
sary.
In our paper described above, entitled "If Saddam is Hitler Then
Who is George Bush?" (and which referred to the first President
Bush and the first Persian Gulf War), we claimed "it would not be a
great exaggeration to say that the United States went to war over an
analogy. ' '24 In fact, it seems that the analogy was so compelling that
much of the rest of the world was willing to go to war, too. And many
of our research subjects were willing to answer the title question that
George H. W. Bush was like Churchill or FDR.
In 2003, the second President Bush failed to get the backing of
most of the world for his decision to invade Iraq. He may have failed
to make a compelling argument because he failed to have a compel-
ling analogy; Saddam might have weapons of mass destruction but
that did not make him Hitler. Given the world's reaction, we wanted
21. Id. at 916.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 914.
24. Id. at 913.
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to ask the question: "When Saddam is not Hitler, who is George
Bush?" The answer to that probably would have changed after Sad-
dam's capture in December 2003.
Note that retrieval-finding a good source analog in memory-
relies heavily on surface similarities between the source and target;
mapping-and the evaluation of the quality of an analogy-depends
more on the relational similarities between the source and target.25
B. Teaching and Training in Analogical Reasoning and Law
Some of what psychologists know about analogy can be applied
to law school teaching and some can be applied to understanding the
use of precedents. Note that a friend of mine, a cynical ex-law school
professor, told me that she believes that law schools do not actually
care how well students learn the process of legal reasoning; they just
want to be able to differentiate the fast learners from the slow learn-
ers for the eventual employers. On the other hand, several years ago
when I was on the psychology academic job market, I met with an as-
sociate dean of a top-twenty law school. He told me that hebelieved
that minority students were dropping out of law school at a higher
rate than non-minority students were-even after equating for enter-
ing LSATs and grades. His suspicion was that many of them just
never caught on to the particular kinds of reasoning processes re-
quired in law school.
The next two questions I address are: (a) given all the training
they get, or practicing they do, do law students get better at using
analogies, and (b) are there ways to train people to get better at using
analogies that might be useful in law schools?
1. Do Law Students Get Better at Using Analogies?
Having been a law student, my subjective experience is yes-we
did get better at using analogies. However, psychologists do not have
any measures that demonstrate that law school improves analogy use.
In the mid-1980s, Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett studied the ef-
fects of various kinds of graduate training on statistical, methodologi-
cal, conditional, and verbal reasoning; the latter included verbal ana-
25. Dedre Gentner et al., The Roles of Similarity in Transfer: Separating Retrievability from
Inferential Soundness, 25 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 524, 560-61 (1993); Keith J. Holyoak & Kyung-
hee Koh, Surface and Structural Similarity in Analogical Transfer, 15 MEMORY & COGNITION
332, 334 (1987).
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logical reasoning (as on the GRE or LSAT).21 The graduate students
were at the University of Michigan studying law, medicine, psychol-
ogy, and chemistry. Students were tested during their first and third
year in their programs. There were a few initial differences in scores;
in particular, law students had higher initial verbal reasoning scores
than psychology, chemistry, or medical students. But the important
data concern how reasoning changed over time. When first-year law
students were compared to third-year law students, there was a slight
but non-statistically significant improvement in verbal reasoning of
about 5 percent. 27 In medicine, psychology, and chemistry the im-
provement was slightly greater (up to 17 percent) but only the medi-
cal students' improvement was statistically significant.21
My subjective experience that we got better at using analogies
during law school might be more related to the facts that: (a) we read
many cases (that were used as source analogs for subsequent hy-
potheticals), and (b) we learned that we were supposed to be looking
for analogies all the time-rather than because we actually improved
in using analogies per se.
2. Could We Help Law Students to Become Better at Using
Analogies?
Despite what a superficial reading of the psychology literature
might suggest, there are ways to improve people's analogical reason-
ing. The usual problem in the psychology literature is that people do
not retrieve relevant analogies from memory. Once they do retrieve
something relevant, however, they tend to be good at seeing rela-
tional similarities and using the analogy.
a. Typical Laboratory Procedure
In the laboratory, analogical reasoning has often been studied us-
ing the following steps:29
26. Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Dis-
cipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 434 (1988).
27. Id. at 437. The improvement was 5 percent in the cross-sectional design (i.e., comparing
a group of first-year students to a group of third-year students) and 4 percent in the longitudinal
design (i.e., comparing individual students across years).
28. Id.
29. Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving, 12 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 306. 307-20 (1980); Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Schema Induction and Ana-
logical Transfer, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 3-4 (1983); Holvoak & Koh, supra note 25, at 333.
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i. Subjects first learn about a way of solving a hypothetical problem
in a story. For example, how might a general deploy his army to at-
tack a well-guarded fortress? Rather than sending all his troops
down one road, a better plan might be to disperse the soldiers and
attack with small units from all sides at once. This divide-spread-
and-converge approach is called the "convergence solution."
ii. Subjects may then be told that they are now in a different ex-
periment-and they will be asked to do some distracting task. Al-
ternatively, they may be asked to leave and come back at some
later time.
iii. Then, subjects get a problem to solve that can be solved analo-
gously to the earlier one. For example, subjects may be told about a
man who has an inoperable tumor in his stomach. There is a "ray"
that can destroy the tumor, but if it is used at sufficient strength to
destroy the tumor, it will also destroy the healthy tissue it passes
through, and the man will soon die. How can the man be saved'?
The typical finding is that only a small percentage of subjects will
use the solution to the earlier fortress problem to create a conver-
gence solution to the later tumor problem-use many less-powerful
rays simultaneously from different angles.30
The main obstacle to using the previous solution is that people
do not think of it-they do not retrieve it from memory. 31 However, if
people are reminded of the previous solution, for example, by a hint
from the experimenter telling them to think back to something that
they learned earlier, then most people will retrieve the source analog,
see the mapping, and solve the tumor problem.32
Note, of course, that this is the task of the law student on an
exam or the lawyer searching for a precedent. With a new fact pat-
tern, they are searching for a good analogous case in memory. But
they have a jump on the subjects in the experiments-at least they
know they should be trying to find an analogous case in memory.
How can such retrieval be improved?
b. Ways of Increasing or Improving the Use of Analogies
Several experiments have demonstrated ways to increase or im-
prove the use of analogies.
30. Gick & Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving, supra note 29, at 318.
31. Id. at 348-49.
32. Id. at 348.
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i. Make Analogs More Superficially Similar to Each Other (So
They Will be Retrieved from Memory)
It has been found that people are more likely to successfully re-
trieve source analogs from memory when those analogs are more su-
perficially similar to the target analog.33 Referring back to the exam-
ples above, when presented with the tumor problem, subjects are less
likely to retrieve the superficially dissimilar fortress analog, and more
likely to retrieve a source analog involving a scientist who uses a spe-
cial ray to repair a light bulb.3 4
Of course, in the law, as elsewhere, the source analogs have al-
ready been created; they cannot be changed to become more easily
found when a relevant target appears. However, although we cannot
change the sources per se, we can change people's representation of
and memory for sources. That is, rather than have the fortress story in
memory as a "story about a general," it could be stored in memory
more abstractly, as a story about how a powerful force can be split up
and then converged to succeed at a task.
Note that the ability to represent and use information at an ab-
stract level is an ability that develops with expertise. In a well-known
study, novice and expert physicists were asked to sort a group of
physics problems into categories. 35 Novices mostly sorted by contrap-
tion-all the pulley problems together, all the spring problems to-
gether, etc. 36 Experts were more likely to sort by the underlying prin-
ciples-all the conservation of momentum problems together, etc. 37 It
seems as if relational features are as obvious (and "superficial") to
experts as surface features are to novices.
ii. Have People Compare and Abstract from Multiple Analogs
Another way to improve the use of analogies in the laboratory is
to have subjects compare and abstract from multiple analogs. For ex-
ample, Gick and Holyoak had some subjects read both the fortress
story and a story about a firefighter (who used many small streams of
33. Gentner et al., supra note 25, at 562; Holvoak & Koh, supra note 25, at 338; RichardCatrambone, The Effects of Surface and Structural Feature Matches on the Access of Story Ana-logs, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 318, 329-30 (2002).
34. Holyoak & Koh, supra note 25, at 335.
35. Michelene T. H. Chi et al., Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by
Experts and Novices, 5 COGNITIVE SCI. 121, 123-24 (1981).
36. Id. at 125.
37. Id. at 125.
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water simultaneously from different directions) before trying to solve
the tumor problem. 38 Subjects were asked to summarize each source
analog individually, then some were asked to compare the two and
write how they were similar. Subjects who read two source analogs
were more than twice as likely to come up with the convergence solu-
tion than the subjects who had read only one source analog. In addi-
tion, for subjects who compared the two analogs, the quality of what
they wrote as similarities predicted their likelihood of using the con-
vergence solution. That is, those who abstracted the convergence so-
lution from the two source analogs were more likely to use it later
than those who did not have a good representation of the underlying
relational similarities in the story.39
Dedre Gentner and her colleagues have recently used this com-
parison technique with materials more relevant to law school learn-
ing-the case-based learning done in business school negotiation
classes. Some of the studies involved different groups of advanced
learners (e.g., MBA students who had previous work experience as
accountants, managers, or executives); those subjects who compared
two cases that were similar in underlying principle were two to three
times as likely to use the principle in a new negotiation as those who
had analyzed the cases one at a time.40 The researchers then repli-
cated the study with novices-university undergraduates who had
never taken a business course.41 All students read two negotiation
cases. Half of the students read trade-off solutions to both cases; the
other half read contingent-contract solutions to both cases. Of each
group, half wrote evaluations of each case separately, and half were
asked to compare the similarities in problems and solutions between
the two cases. Even with novices, such comparisons were effective.
Students who had done the comparison were more likely to propose a
more sophisticated solution than students who had not done the com-
parison.4 2 (The latter students were more likely to propose an inferior
compromise solution.) In particular, students who had done a com-
parison were more likely to transfer the principle of the cases they
38. Gick & Holyoak, Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer, supra note 29, at 3, 16, 22.
39. Id. at 23-24.
40. Jeffrey Loewenstein et al., Analogical Encoding Facilitates Knowledge Transfer in Ne-
gotiation, 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 586, 590 (1999); Leigh Thompson et al., Avoiding
Missed Opportunities in Managerial Life: Analogical Training More Powerful than Individual
Case Training, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 60, 67 (2000).
41. Dedre Gentner et al., Learning and Transfer: A General Role for Analogical Encoding,
95 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 393, 399 (2003).
42. Id. at 398-99.
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had compared than the other principle.43 The researchers also found
that the use of the principle transferred to a face-to-face negotiation . 4
iii. Train People to Abstract Principles from Single Analogs
Another way to improve analogical reasoning is to train people
to learn to encode single source analogs at an abstract level.4 5
Mandler and Orlich had subjects read the fortress story and then de-
scribe the story at one of three different levels of abstraction. In the
Detail condition, they were instructed to give a summary of the story
details; in the Gist condition, they were asked to summarize the main
points of the story by stating the general's goal, dilemma, and solu-
tion; in the Abstract condition they were asked to look at the rela-
tions in the story between the goal, dilemma, and solution, to abstract
a general principle, and to state the principle as a generalizable solu-
tion. 46 The subjects were then given three distracter reasoning prob-
lems and then the tumor problem. The researchers found that many
of the subjects produced summaries that differed from the type re-
quested in the assigned condition. 47 After re-assigning subjects by
categorizing their written summaries, they found that very few sub-
jects who provided Detail summaries (3 out of 2 1)48 used the conver-
gence solution to solve the tumor problem; more subjects who pro-
vided Gist summaries (15 out of 45) used that solution; and all of the
subjects who provided an Abstract summary (8 out of 8) found that
solution? 9 Note that very few subjects actually succeeded in creating
an Abstract-level summary, suggesting that such an encoding is hard
to do without either training or practice. 50
43. Id. at 399.
44. Id. at 401.
45. Jean M. Mandler & Felice Orlich, Analogical Transfer: The Roles of Schema Abstrac-
tion and Awareness, 31 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 485, 485 (1993).
46. Id. at 485-86.
47. Id. at 486.
48. 1 am reminded of the student in the movie THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox
1973) who had a perfect memory for the facts of cases but could not abstract their contents.
49. Note that some subjects in the Abstract condition wrote summaries that were "so ab-
stract as to be vacuous." For example: "The general had a goal which he could not achieve di-
rectly so he came up with an ingenuous solution." Those subjects were considered to be in a
meta-level condition and only 1 of those 15 subjects used the convergence solution. Thus, there
is a curvilinear relation between abstraction and usefulness. Mandler & Orlich, supra note 45, at
486.
50. Id.
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C. Selecting and Using Analogies in Judicial Reasoning and Legal
Scholarship: The Role of Unconscious Influences, Goals, and
Coherence
Using analogies is not cut and dried. Most analogies are ambigu-
ous; they can be seen as better or worse depending on factors that can
be articulated. However, more than just logic may be at work. Under-
standing the factors that can motivate the selection or use of prece-
dents can be valuable in creating, understanding, and deconstructing
legal arguments.
1. Unconscious Influences
People may show unconscious influences of irrelevant parts
(perhaps superficial features) of the source analog on selecting and
using analogies. In one of my all-time favorite experiments, Thomas
Gilovich had students in a political science class read about a hypo-
thetical political crisis and questioned them about whether they
thought the United States should intervene 1 One reason I like this
experiment so much is that it captures what, at least for a while in
American history (perhaps the 1980s and t990s), was the basic
analogical war regarding wars: if you were in favor of an intervention
you argued "this situation is like World War II" (a winning position
for George H. W. Bush); if you were against an intervention you
argued "getting involved in this situation is like getting involved in
Vietfiaw.:'risis involved a threatened attack by Country A, a large to-
talitarian country, against Country B, a small democratic country.
Unbeknownst to the subjects, there were two versions of the story,
which differed on superficial features only. In the version designed to
evoke thoughts of World War II, there is a briefing in Winston Chur-
chill Hall, the United States troops are traveling in troop transports,
Country A is massing troops for a "blitzkrieg," and minorities are
fleeing Country A in boxcars to neutral Country C.52 In the version
designed to evoke thoughts of the Vietnam War, the briefing is in
Dean Rusk Hall, U.S. troops are traveling in helicopters, Country A
is massing for a "quickstrike," and minorities are fleeing in small
boats through the Gulf of Country C.53
5L. Thomas Gilovich, Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar
Events on Judgments and Decisions, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 802-03 (1981).
52. Id. at 804.
53. Id.
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When subjects were asked to select a political option ranging
from appeasement of Country A to direct military intervention, those
who read the version with the superficial reminders of World War II
made more interventionist recommendations than those who read the
version with the superficial reminders of Vietnam. Yet later, when the
subjects were asked to rate how similar the story was to both World
War II and to Vietnam, the differences in superficial details had no
effect. 54 Warns Gilovich: "[T]hough there is certainly a great deal of
truth to Santayana's maxim that 'those who do not remember the past
are condemned to relive it,' one might also be cautioned that those
who do not forget the past can be led to misapply it."'55
2. Goals
As mentioned previously, it is not always clear which of several
analogical mappings is "better." If Saddam was Hitler, was George
Bush FDR or Churchill? We know that in the laboratory, a person's
goals, interests, or beliefs can influence which of several equally good
mappings he or she will choose. Someone who has a reason to want
an analogy to look more or less appropriate, can, even unintention-
ally, make it seem so. This finding should apply to the real-world se-
lection of relevant precedents.
Consider the following experiment.56 Subjects read a science fic-
tion story in which they learned about two different planets. On
Planet 1, there were three countries: Afflu was economically strong
and gave economic aid to Barebrute; Barebrute was economically
weak but militarily strong and gave military aid to Compak; Compak
was militarily weak. Planet 2 had four countries. Grainwell was eco-
nomically strong and gave economic aid to the economically weak
Hungerall; Millpower was militarily strong and gave military aid to
the militarily weak Mightless.
Subjects were first asked to make military and/or economic rec-
ommendations-for each country subjects could select whether to
give it aid, create an alliance, do both, or state if they were unsure.
Then subjects were asked to match the countries of Planet 2 to the
countries of Planet 1. Which country was like Afflu? Easy, nearly all
answered Grainwell. Which was like Compak? Also easy, nearly all
54. Id. at 806.
55. Id. at 807-08.
56. Barbara A. Spellman & Keith J. Holyoak, Pragmatics in Analogical Mapping, 31
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 307, 320-22 (1996).
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answered Mightless. But which was like Barebrute? That is harder;
there are reasons to map it to both Hungerall and Millpower.
In turns out that subjects' mapping depended on the recommen-
dations they were asked to make. Subjects in the control condition,
who made both economic and military recommendations, saw Bare-
brute as slightly more like Millpower than Hungerall. 57 Subjects who
made only military recommendations saw Barebrute as much more
like the militarily strong Millpower than the economically weak Hun-
gerall. 58 In contrast, subjects who made only economic recommenda-
tions saw Barebrute as more like the economically weakHungerall
than the militarily strong Millpower. 59
Thus, processing goals, or previous knowledge or concerns, may
drive the mapping within an ambiguous analogy.
3. Coherence
The previous sections suggest that people may be using prior
knowledge or goals, either consciously or unconsciously, to select
analogies. However, the selection of an analog, or relevant precedent,
can be the result not just of a particular goal, but might emerge out of
a general pressure for cognitive coherence-that is, the tendency for
people to be consistent in their reasoning. Dan Simon and colleagues
have studied how people's views of the applicability of a source ana-
log (a precedent) changes in line with other changes in their opin-
ions.60 In the basic study, subjects (undergraduates) read a legal case
called "Caught in the Net," which was loosely based on an actual le-
gal case.61 The plaintiff, a software company named Quest, was suing
Jack Smith, an individual investor in the company, for libel. Smith
57. Id. at 323.
58. Id. at 322.
59. Id.
60. Dan Simon is Associate Professor at the University of Southern California Law School;
his main psychologist collaborators are Keith J. Holyoak, University of California at Los Ange-
les Department of Psychology, and Stephen J. Read, University of Southern California De-
partment of Psychology.
61. The experiment described comes from Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional
Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 3, 4-5 (1999); see also Dan Simon et al., The Emergence of Coherence Over the Course of
Decision Making, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 1250,
1252 (2001); Dan Simon et al., Construction of Preferences by Constraint Satisfiction, 15
PSYCHOL. SC. (forthcoming May 2004), available at http://www.psychologicalsciencc.org/ jour-
nals/ps/15_5.cfm. For an overview of that research and its application to the legal system see
Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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had posted a negative message about the company on an electronic
bulletin board directed at investors, and shortly thereafter the stock's
price dropped drastically and the company went bankrupt.
Before reading the case, subjects were asked to give their opin-
ions about a number of issues that (unbeknownst to them) would be
relevant to the case. One issue they were asked about was whether
they thought messages posted on electronic bulletin boards should be
treated like items published in newspapers or like messages sent over
a telephone network. Later, as part of the case, subjects learned that
defamatory messages published in a newspaper could give rise to a
cause of action for libel whereas those transmitted by telephone could
not. After reading the case, subjects were then asked questions prob-
ing the same issues as the pre-case questions, including how electronic
bulletin board messages should be treated.
Subjects were about equally divided in verdicts. And, before
reading the case, subjects found the two analogies (to a newspaper or
to a telephone) equally compelling. However, after rendering their
verdicts, subjects widely diverged. Those who found for Quest be-
lieved that the newspaper analogy was much better than the tele-
phone analogy; the opposite was true for those who found for Smith.61
Thus, belief in the quality of an analogy shifted coherently along with
other beliefs that lead them to make a decision.
II. CAUSAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING
The other topic I have done the most research on is causal rea-
soning and its close kin, counterfactual reasoning.63 Obviously, causal-
62. Holyoak & Simon, supra note 61, at 9.
63. The following papers are empirical studies about how people reason when they see
multiple instances of cause and effect; I call this "causal reasoning in science": Barbara A.Spellman et al., How Two Causes are Different from One: The Use of (Un)Conditional Informa-
tion in Simpson's Paradox, 29 MEMORY & COGNITION 193 (2001); Barbara A. Spellman, Acting
as Intuitive Scientists: Contingency Judgments are Made While Controlling for Alternative Poten-
tial Causes, 7 PSYCHOL. ScI. 337 (1996).
The following papers are empirical studies about how people reason when they see only oneinstance of cause and effect; I call this "causal reasoning in law": Barbara A. Spellman. Credit-
ing Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: GEN. 323 (1997); Barbara A. Spellman. The
Relation Between Counterfactual and Causal Reasoning: Availability Mediates Some of theSimilarities and Differences in Judgments (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
The following papers are mostly reviews of previous literature and argue how causal reasoning
in science and law, and counterfactual reasoning, are related: Barbara A. Spellman & David R.Mandel, Causal Reasoning, Psychology of, in L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 461-66(L. Nadel ed., 2003); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between
Counterfactual ("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for
Jurors' Decisions, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001); Barbara A. Spellman & David R.
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ity is a fundamental topic in the law: without a well-defined notion of
causality we would not want to assign liability or punishment. Many
weeks of law school, most memorably in torts and criminal law, were
spent on issues of causality. Not only is there a lot for law students or
lawyers to learn about case law involving causality, but for jurors
there may be lengthy jury instructions at the end of a trial explaining
how "causality" should be construed in that particular instance.
Elsewhere I have discussed various experimental findings relat-
ing causal and counterfactual reasoning and suggested implications
for jury decision-making. 64 Here I describe a few things that psycholo-
gists know about how lay people reason about causality and how it is
consistent, or inconsistent, with legal notions of causality.
A. Uninstructed People "Get" the Difference Between But-for and
Proximate Cause
The law makes the distinction between causes in fact (or but-for
causes) and causes in law (or proximate causes). To qualify as a but-
for cause, something must be an antecedent to an outcome without
which the outcome would not have occurred. There are, of course, an
infinite number of things that would qualify as but-for causes of any
outcome (see example below). However, the law distinguishes the
larger set of but-for causes from the subset of things that will be
treated as legal causes-thereby limiting our causal responsibility for
the myriad consequences of our actions.
It turns out that uninstructed people easily distinguish between
but-for and proximate causes of an event. I asked undergraduate sub-
jects to read the following story:65
A young woman was driving home from work. She had left early
that day because it was a holiday weekend and traffic was very
heavy. She was the first car to stop at a particular red light. Behind
her was a long line of cars with a school bus at the end. As she was
waiting for the light to turn green, she reached down to change the
radio station. At that moment the light finally turned green, but she
took an extra few seconds to find a song she liked. She then accel-
erated and the cars and bus accelerated behind her. Just as the
school bus got into the intersection, a car driven by an upset man
Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality, 8
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 120 (1999).
64. Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 63, at 261-64.
65. Barbara A. Spellman, The Relation Between Counterfactual and Causal Reasoning:
Availability Mediates Some of the Similarities and Differences in Judgments 11-13 (2003) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
I[Vol 79:1 187
REFLECTIONS OFA RECOVERING LA IVYER
who had been fired that day came screaming through the red light
from the other direction hitting the bus and injuring many children.
Half of the subjects were instructed to answer a but-for question:
"Please list four ways in which the events of the story could be
changed so that the outcome would be different." The other half of
the subjects were instructed to answer a "regular" causality question:
"What would you say was the cause of the outcome? Please list as
many factors as you think caused the result." They were then asked to
rate each factor on a scale from 0-10 as to how important a factor it
was.
Subjects in the but-for condition were very likely to list things re-
lated to the woman at the green light and to the holiday weekend as
things that could be changed to change the outcome. 66 Subjects in the
causality condition rated what the man did at the light as being the
most causal event. Subsequent studies replicated that pattern.67 In an-
other study, subjects were given a long list of things to rate as to ei-
ther but-for causality or regular causality. In the but-for condition,
subjects rated all kinds of things as but-for causes (in addition to
those mentioned above, and things related to the man being upset
and running the red light, school being open that day, the position of
the bus in the line, etc). In the causality condition, only things related
to the man being upset and running the red light were rated as causal.
Note that these results should not be surprising. The legal phi-
losophers Hart and Honors have argued that the notion of what
counts as a cause under the law is the same as people's notion of what
counts as a cause in every day life.68
B. Uninstructed People "Get" How to Deal with Multiple Sufficient
Causes
Cases of multiple sufficient causes create headaches for philoso-
phers, lawyers, and psychologists. Consider the following example:69
Reed hates Smith and wants to kill him. West also hates Smith (for
an entirely different reason) and also wants to kill him. One dayReed shoots Smith in the head. At the exact same instant, West
shoots Smith in the heart. Smith dies. The coroner says that either
shot alone would have been enough to kill Smith.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id.
68. H. L. A. HART& TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW at Iv (2d ed. 1985).
69. Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 63, at 251.
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Under a but-for causality rule neither Reed nor West caused
Smith's death: Reed could argue that if he had not shot Smith, Smith
would have died anyway; West can argue exactly the same thing. Yet
the law is not happy to let them go free and has figured ways to rede-
fine but-for causality in such cases. 71
What do uninstructed people do? When presented with the
above fact pattern, and asked to list ways in which the events of the
story could be changed so that the outcome would be different, most
subjects wrote that they would have to change both Reed and West's
actions together to change the outcome. Subjects who were asked to
list the causes of the outcome listed Reed and West individually. And
when asked how much jail time each should serve, most gave Reed
and West each the maximum. 7'
Thus, despite acknowledging that neither Reed nor West alone
was a but-for cause of Smith's death, subjects treated them as indi-
vidually causal-in accordance with what the law proscribes.
C. Other Uninstructed Causality Judgments
Subjects acting as mock jurors do not get all causal reasoning
"right" according to the law. For the most part, they "get" superced-
ing intervening causes.7 2 However, they may inappropriately take the
length of a causal chain into account and show a "causal proximity"
bias (i.e., view events closer to the outcome as more causal).73 Their
causal judgments may also be influenced by different counterfactuals
that come to mind or that are presented while they are reasoning
about a case.74
70. Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339,
352-57 (1992).
71. Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 63, at 252-53.
72. Barbara A. Spellman, The Construction of Causal Explanations for Temporally Re-
lated Events (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles) (on
file with author).
73. Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil Liabil-
itv, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 287 (1985).
74. Nyla R. Branscombe et al., Rape and Accident Counterfactuals: Who Might Have Done
Otherwise and Would It Have Changed the Outcome?, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042,
1061-64 (1996); Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 63, at 261-64; see NEAL FEIGENSON,
LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 125, 155 (2000) (examples
of lawyers' actual use of counterfactual arguments).
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D. Do Jury Instructions About Causality Help?
A major question we are left with is whether jury instructions
help jurors to reason about causality in the way the law wants them to
reason. I think that the conclusion from the experimental evidence we
have so far is: we don't know.
What happens when subjects are asked to reason about (legal)
causality when no instructions are given? When subjects acting as
mock jurors making decisions about punitive damages were notin-
structed at all on issues of causality, some subjects (60 percent) spon-
taneously raised issues of causality and of those many (58 percent)
wrote as if they were considering but-for causality to be their guide.75
(On the other hand, the Reed and West experiment described above
suggests that subjects do not always spontaneously use but-for causal
reasoning-at least when it is not appropriate in cases of multiple suf-
ficient causes.)
What happens when instructions about causality are given? In a
different set of studies, involving causal proximity (i.e., the length of a
causal chain from the initial negligent action to the outcome), subjects
were given jury instructions on causality. One set of experimental ma-
terials was described as follows:7 6
In the handgun case a businessman left a briefcase containing
handguns in an empty chair of an airport waiting area. In the sim-
ple-causal-chain version, the briefcase was stolen by a maladjusted
individual who used one of the guns to shoot and severely injure a
taxi driver. In the complex-causal-chain version, the briefcase was
taken by a security guard to the lost-and-found department, where
the gun was stolen by the lost-and-found clerk. The maladjusted in-
dividual later picked this gun from the pocket of the clerk and usedit to shoot the taxi driver. In both versions the driver sued the busi-
nessman for his injuries.
The jury instructions included definitions of negligence and
proximate cause77 but did not mention how jurors should consider the
length of a causal chain; however, in the second experiment the sub-
jects also read "[a] person... is not relieved of liability because of the
intervening act of a third person (or persons) if such act was reasona-
bly foreseeable at the time of his negligent conduct."78
75. Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
227, 236 (1999). Note that subjects in this experiment were not students, they were "citizens
sampled from the Denver area." Id. at 233.
76. Johnson & Drobny, supra note 73, at 285.
77. BAJI Nos. 3.00, 310, 3.11, & 3.75 (6th ed. 1977) (California Jury Instructions Civil).
78. Johnson & Drobny, supra note 73. at 288.
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Regardless of the particular instructions, in both experiments
subjects rated the defendant as being less liable in the scenario with
the longer causal chain. 9 The authors suggest that "one factor con-
tributing to the causal proximity effect may have been some subjects'
disregard of these instructions." 0 However, because there is no condi-
tion in which subjects were not given instructions, we cannot actually
evaluate the effect of the instructions per se.
What happens when instructions about things that jurors think
they understand well-other than causality-are given? A very inter-
esting set of studies by Vicki L. Smith suggests that sometimes people
will rely more on their commonsense views than on judge's instruc-
tions." Smith had some subjects describe what they thought were the
elements of various crimes including assault, burglary, kidnapping,
murder, and robbery. She found that people had ideas of what these
crimes would generally be like (i.e., "prototypes"). Other subjects,
acting as mock jurors, read various crime scenarios and were given in-
structions about the elements of the crimes. She found that regardless
of when the instructions were given (either before or after reading the
crime scenarios), subjects were more likely to convict when the crimes
were closer to the prototype, and that instructed subjects made the
same judgments as subjects who did not receive instructions about the
elements of the crime at all.82 Thus, subjects used their pre-existing
knowledge or beliefs about what constitutes a particular crime rather
than the judge's instructions about what constituted the crime.
E. Should Jurors Be Instructed About Causality?
The question whether jurors should be instructed about causality
has two components. The first is related to the discussion in Section D
above-can jury instructions help jurors to reason about causality in
the way the law wants them to reason? Instructions are good in that
they create uniformity both to all the jurors in the same case and to
jurors across cases. However, given Smith's findings, and given that
79. Id. at 290.
80. Id. at 293.
81. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 868-69 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Prototypes in the
Courtroom]; Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, When Prior Knowledge and
Law CollideJ.
82. Smith, PrototYpes in the Courtroom, supra note 81, at 868; Smith, When Prior Knowl-
edge and Law Collide, supra note 81, at 532-33.
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people certainly have pre-existing knowledge and beliefs about cau-
sality, we might infer that in any clash people will rely on their own
beliefs rather than on jury instructions when evaluating causality.
The second component is to ask whether the law should want
people to reason differently about causality in a case than in everyday
life. Hart and Honor6 often defend the view that cause in law is like
cause in life, for example: "causal judgments, though the law may
have to systematize them, are not specifically legal. They appeal to a
notion which is part of everyday life and which ordinary people, in-
cluding jurymen, can handle with a minimum of guidance."83 The no-
tion of proximate cause often seems to be an attempt to capture so-
cietal views of fairness.84 Perhaps causality might be an issue for which
community views and people's moral intuitions ought to be guiding
the legal standards.85 But before changing anything, psychologists
should learn more about those views and, if necessary, whether and
how instructions could work.
III. OTHER TOPICS IN COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
A. Other Topics I Have Studied
When I look at the list of other topics I have researched as a psy-
chologist, I find it simple to relate each to issues in the law. With vari-
ous collaborators, I have studied hypothesis testing-how people
evaluate evidence and theories. In particular, we looked at how peo-
ple search for, and use, evidence that might disconfirm a hypothesis6
Several good research programs have applied insights from cognitive
83. HART & HONORE, supra note 68, at Iv.
84. Proximate cause
is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the con-
sequences of his conduct. In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to
eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and beyond.... As a
practical matter. . ., [s]ome boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act,
upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236-37 (4th ed. 1971).
85. This idea is suggested by Robinson and Darley's consideration of community views and
criminal law. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 212-15 (1995).
86. Alexandra Kincannon & Barbara A. Spellman, The Use of Category and Similarity In-formation in Limiting Hypotheses, 31 MEMORY & COGNITION 114, 130-31 (201)3); Barbara A.
Spellman et al., Hypothesis Testing: Strategy Selection for Generalising Versus Limiting tly-
potheses, 5 THINKING & REASONING 67 (1999).
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and social psychology to how jurors use evidence in arriving at a ver-
dict.87
I have done some research in the field of metamemory-people's
beliefs about how their own (and others) memory will perform-and
metacognition-people's beliefs about how well they understand in-
formation.," In general, the field of memory has been one of the
dominant areas within psychology and law research. Research on
eyewitness testimony and line-up identifications certainly represents
some of the successes of psychology research in influencing the legal
system.89 Studies have examined jurors' willingness to believe wit-
nesses who seem confident in their memories, despite the fact that re-
searchers know that confidence and accuracy are often uncorrelated. 0
However, more could be done to examine, for example, whether ju-
rors really understand the problems of weighting different kinds of
evidence (e.g., hearsay evidence) and whether jurors can accurately
judge whether they have understood expert testimony or jury instruc-
tions. Note that the issue in metacognition is not whether jurors un-
derstand, for example, jury instructions; there is plenty of research
showing that often they do not. The issue is one of calibration-are
they good judges of whether or not they understand. If people know
that they don't understand something, they can ask for clarification (if
they feel free to do so and if clarification is available). The dangerous
situation is when they don't know that they don't understand and so
proceed anyway.91
87. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Test of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992): Deanna
Kuhn et al., How Well do Jurors Reason?: Competence Dimensions of Individual Variation in a
Juror Reasoning Task, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 289 (1994).
88. Barbara A. Spellman & Robert A. Bjork, When Predictions Create Reality: Judgments
of Learning May Alter What They Are Intended to Assess, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315-16 (1992).
89. But as Gary Wells points out, what convinced the legal field to take the psychologists'
suggestion how to use line-ups was not that they thought the research was good and persuasive.
Good research in this area has been around for a while. Rather, what convinced them was the
more common use of DNA evidence, and the discovery that there were many people on death
row who didn't belong there, and that most of them were convicted mainly or solely on the basis
of an eyewitness identification. That, he says, is what pushed the courts into checking in with the
psychologists.
90. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing
Their Forensic Relation, t PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 817, 825-26 (1995); John S. Shaw Ill &
Tana K. Zerr, Extra Effort During Memory Retrieval May Be Associated With Increases in Eye-
witness Confidence, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 326-27 (2003).
91. Regarding jurors' ability to understand instruction, see generally Joel D. Lieberman &
Bruce D. Sales, Vhat Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y, & L. 589 (1997); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of tie Law in
Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992).
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I have also investigated inhibition in memory-how actively us-
ing some information in memory might cause other competing infor-
mation to become inaccessible.12 John Shaw and colleagues have di-
rectly applied this research to issues involving the repeated
questioning of witnesses to a crime and found similar results.93
B. Current Topics in Psychological Research
In Fall 2002, I taught a graduate course called Cognitive and So-
cial Psychology Issues in the Law. The class included eleven psychol-
ogy graduate students, one psychology post-doc, and one lone, brave,
law student." The first day I went around the classroom and asked the
students what each was doing research on. My intent was obvious-to
illustrate how every topic could be made relevant to psychology and
law. The task was simple.
What did the cognitive psychologists study?
The first student said that she studies cognition and aging. What
relevant issues did the class come up with? They started in the court-
room-with declining memory and slower mental processes, should
we worry about older jurors? But then they moved beyond it to issues
including: age discrimination; the relation between declining cognitive
abilities and the concept of "intent" in crimes and the perception of
danger (should there be a "rational old person" standard); issues of
competence; the fact that people try to take advantage of old people
so there should be laws to protect them against scams; and the con-
troversy over laws requiring older drivers to re-take driving tests.
The second student told us that she studies memory for informa-
tion as presented in different kinds of displays -including virtual real-
ity.95 Again, they started with juries-obviously that research is rele-
vant for how information should be presented to jurors. But again,
they moved beyond juries to issues regarding warning labels and road
signs and violence on television.
92. Michael C. Anderson & Barbara A. Spellman, On the Status of Inhibitory Mechanisms
in Cognition: Memory Retrieval as a Model Case, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 68, 88 (1995).
93. John S. Shaw III et al., Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in An Eyewitness-Memory Para-
digm, 2 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 249, 252 (1995).
94. Thanks to them all for a great class: Kevin Carlsmith, Liz Dunn, Mandy Hege, DebbyKermer, Jaime Kurtz, Anna Macintosh, Shawn O'Hargan, Charles Richardson, Karen Siedlecki,
Jeanine Skorinko, Jeanine Stefanucci, Justin Storbeck, and Amelie Werther.
95. Jeanine K. Stefanucci & Dennis R. Proffitt. Providing Distinctive Cues to Augment
Human Memory, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 840, 840-44 (Wayne Gray & Christian Shunn eds., 2002).
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The third student told us that she studies source memory (that is
memory for the origin of remembered information). Of course that
topic, as a subset of eyewitness memory research, has long been a sta-
ple of psychology and law research.
The lone developmental psychologist does research on children's
ability to use analogies. That topic has been researched with a par-
ticular eye towards children's ability to use dolls to represent them-
selves and others when they talk about sexual abuse.
And the social psychologists?
Two said that they study emotion-and the effects of emotion on
memory and reasoning. We just laughed. There were too many places
to start.
The post-doc told us that he studies why people want to punish
others. He already has law-related publications on that issue.96
Two students said that they studied affective forecasting. Affec-
tive forecasting is currently a hot topic in social psychology.97 It refers
to peoples' ability to predict their future mental states. For example,
you might ask a Chicago Cubs fan, "How happy would you be, on a
1-10 scale, the day after the Cubs won a World Series?" A typical an-
swer might be 10. "How happy would you be a week later?" 9. The
usual finding in such studies is that people can reliably predict the di-
rection of their emotions (e.g., they are right that they would be hap-
pier, rather than sadder, if the Cubs could win) but they greatly over-
estimate the duration of their emotions (e.g., after a week they are
pretty much back to their normal happiness baseline). Scholars are
beginning to apply affective forecasting to law-related issues, most
obviously to statutory and case decisions regarding damages and pun-
ishment.98
Another student said that she studies implicit attitudes-another
hot topic in social psychology. The issue is whether people have un-
conscious attitudes-towards people, groups, and policies-that in-
96. Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Vhy. Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002); John M. Darley et al, Inca-
pacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Sept. 7, 2003,
at 44; Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Location, Location, Location: The Misprediction of Satisfaction
in Housing Lotteries, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1421, 1422, 1429 (2003).
98. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,
80 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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fluence their thoughts and behavior. Reference to implicit attitude re-
search has already filtered into legal consciousness. 9
And another student said that she studies stereotyping-yet an-
other hot topic in social psychology. When I disingenuously asked her
what that had to do with law, she pointed to: criminal profiling; crime
definitions and sentencing guidelines; juror selection; and juror's abil-
ity to have empathy for defendants and their biases in verdicts and
sentencing.'00
The above topics represent standard areas of basic research in a
highly ranked (top 20) Psychology Department. 0' All have implica-
tions for the legal system. The last few weeks of the course, pairs of
students selected topics, assigned class readings, and ran the discus-
sion, on topics of their own choosing. What topics did the students
choose? Jury selection; punitive damages; hate crime legislation;
polygraphs; confessions; and the use of simulations and animation in
courtroom exhibits. Not a terrible set of topics, but not a great set ei-
ther. I think that they still do not understand the potential richness
and value of their psychological knowledge. On the other hand, per-
haps they were afraid to venture too far outward because they could
not find any existing relevant law-related literature to assign to the
class.
CONCLUSION
I tried to write this Article wearing my psychology hat but carry-
ing my lawyer binoculars. That is not an easy thing to do. With my
psychology hat on, I can see the appeal to psychologists of grabbing
"sexy" law issues to research. It seems to me that psychologists often
do not have a clue as to how relevant their everyday research is to the
legal system-because they do not know what enough of the legal is-
sues are. It also seems to me that lawyers find it easy to grab old psy-
chology and apply it to law-because they do not know of the exis-
tence of current relevant psychological research.
99. See Amy L Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
100. Jeanine L. Skorinko. Race-Crime Associations and Consequences for Juror Decision
Making (2003) (unpublished master's thesis, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
101. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS 89 (2003 ed. 2002).
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So here is my final thought-and challenge: (1) every law,"'
every procedure, every process, every precedent, every legal outcome
is ripe for psychological study, and (2) every topic in "higher-order
cognition" (which includes both cognitive psychology and social cog-
nition) is ripe to be applied to the legal system.
To quote my anti-hero John McLauglin: "Discuss."
102. Here I echo James R. P. Ogloff, who wrote: "Indeed, to the extent ... ever), law has as
its purpose the control or regulation of human behavior, every law is ripe tor psychological
study." Ogloff, supra note 4, at 474.
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